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EXPANDING WISCONSIN’S APPROACH 
TO THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION 
This Comment analyzes Wisconsin’s application of the business 
records exception when a litigant seeks the admission of third-party 
records.  In 2010, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in Palisades 
Collection LLC v. Kalal, applied a narrow interpretation of the 
exception’s requirements that stands in contrast to manner in which 
federal jurisdictions apply the exception in the same context.  This 
Comment addresses the question of whether Wisconsin’s narrower 
construction of the exception is the best approach to the evidentiary rule.  
In doing so, this Comment first reviews the federal business record 
exception, its requirements, and federal courts’ treatment of the 
foundational requirement for third-party records.  This Comment then 
does the same for the Wisconsin exception, discussing the challenges and 
harms created by Wisconsin’s narrow approach.  Finally, it suggests that 
Wisconsin adopt an approach similar to that of a growing number of 
federal courts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A newly married middle class couple—let’s call them Jim and 
Pam—purchased their first home in Janesville, Wisconsin, in 2007 with 
no down payment.  Pam was employed as a stylist at a local salon and 
spa; Jim worked the assembly line at the local General Motors plant.  
Although money was tight, they met their monthly obligations and were 
still able to eat out occasionally.  In early 2008, the couple announced 
they were expecting their first child.  In anticipation of being a stay-at-
home mom, Pam left her job at the salon.  Unfortunately, later that 
year, Jim received notice that General Motors planned to close the 
Janesville plant, leaving him without a job. 
As shifts were cut back and production slowed, financial pressures 
increased.  Medical bills for the new baby girl, Cece, mounted.  Jim and 
Pam struggled to meet their monthly financial obligations.  They began 
to miss their mortgage payments.  Credit card payments were reduced to 
the minimum.  By the time the plant closed in April of 2009, Jim and 
Pam were swimming in debt and seemingly unable to find relief.   
One of the couple’s original creditors, Sabre Bank, frustrated in its 
attempts to collect on the debts, sold the debts to third-party creditors 
for five cents on the dollar, writing off the remainder.  Jim and Pam then 
received collection notices from the new creditors.  In 2013, the couple 
was unable to make suitable arrangements with one of the new 
creditors—Dunder Mifflin Financial (Dunder Mifflin).  Dunder Mifflin, 
the purchaser of Jim and Pam’s credit card debt, served the couple with 
a summons and complaint.  Dunder Mifflin moved for summary 
judgment.  To support the motion, Dunder Mifflin submitted its own 
financial records, which included the records acquired from Sabre Bank.  
To meet the foundational requirements of the business records 
exception, Dunder Mifflin also submitted an affidavit from its records 
custodian, Kelly Kapur, declaring that she fully understood Dunder 
Mifflin’s process for creating the records and could attest to the records’ 
accuracy.  How will the court rule?  How should the court rule?  What is 
the proper application of the business records exception when parties 
rely on third-party records as part of their own business records?  
The issue presented in the above hypothetical is arising in 
courtrooms across the country with increasing frequency.  “Across the 
nation, there is a surge in lawsuits against people who aren’t paying their 
bills, driven by the debt-buying industry that has boomed . . . as a sea of 
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souring loans and credit-card obligations have become cheaper and 
cheaper to buy amid hard economic times.”1  The lawsuits are not 
coming from the original debt holders but from debt purchasers.2  Debt 
purchasers can buy debts for pennies on the dollar and commence the 
collection process.3  When the collection process fails, these companies 
turn to the courts.4  Wisconsin has not proved immune to these types of 
lawsuits.5  The surge of debt collection suits being brought by successors 
in interest to the debt brings with it the question of whether the business 
records exception in Wisconsin is appropriately interpreted to protect 
both creditors and debtors. 
In 2010, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the application 
of the business records exception in its opinion in Palisades Collection 
LLC v. Kalal.6  The case raised the question of what a debt purchaser 
must do to lay a foundation for the records of the original debt holder in 
order for the business records exception to apply.7  The court held that, 
absent a qualified witness who could attest to the creation of the original 
 
1.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—In Lawsuits, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at A1. 
2.  Id. (“The big explosion in lawsuits is coming not from lenders but from firms who buy 
debt.”). 
3.  Karen Weise, The Debt Collection Business Isn’t Pretty, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-01/the-debt-col
lection-business-isn-t-pretty, archived at http://perma.cc/GKU3-Q5S6 (“On average, a buyer 
will pay 4¢ on the dollar.”). 
4.  Silver-Greenberg, supra note 1, at A16 (describing the involvement of courts in the 
debt-buying industry as an “explosion”). 
5.  See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Alexander, No. 2012AP002236, 350 Wis. 2d 506, 
838 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished table decision); Bank of Am. 
N.A. v. Minkov, No. 2012AP2643, 350 Wis. 2d 507, 838 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2013) (unpublished table decision); Dow Family, LLC v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 2013 WI App 
114, 350 Wis. 2d 411, 838 N.W.2d 119; Bank of Am. NA v. Neis, 2013 WI App 89, 349 Wis. 2d 
461, 835 N.W.2d 527; Cent. Prairie Fin. LLC v. Yang, 2013 WI App 82, 348 Wis. 2d 583, 833 
N.W.2d 866; PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bierbrauer, 2013 WI App 11, 346 Wis. 2d 1, 827 N.W.2d 124; 
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2010A v. Gartland, No. 2012AP756-FT, 344 Wis. 2d 299, 821 
N.W.2d 414 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012) (unpublished table decision); Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. 
v. Dr. Manelle Fernando Med. Clinic, Inc., No. 2011AP222, 338 Wis. 2d 212, 808 N.W.2d 175 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (unpublished table decision); BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P. 
v. Williams, No. 2010AP002334, 337 Wis. 2d 557, 806 N.W.2d 269 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 
2011); Bank of N.Y. v. Cano, No. 2010AP000477, 331 Wis. 2d 731, 795 N.W.2d 493 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 20, 2011) (unpublished table decision); HSBC Bank Nev. NA v. Griswold, Nos. 
2010AP759, 2010AP1826, 331 Wis. 2d 489, 795 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2010) 
(unpublished table decision). 
6.  2010 WI App 38, 324 Wis. 2d 180, 781 N.W.2d 503. 
7.  Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 13. 
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debt records, the records were hearsay.8  The holding in Palisades, which 
is a narrow interpretation of the exception’s requirements, stands in 
contrast to various federal jurisdictions’ application of the exception in 
the same context.9  These contrasting interpretations and applications of 
the business records exception invite the question of whether 
Wisconsin’s narrower construction of the exception is the best approach 
to the evidentiary rule. 
This Comment contends that Wisconsin’s foundational requirements 
for third-party records to qualify for the business records exception are 
too restrictive.  In doing so, this Comment first reviews the federal 
business record exception, its requirements, and federal courts’ 
treatment of the foundational requirement for third-party records.10  
This Comment then does the same for the Wisconsin exception, 
discussing the challenges and harms created by Wisconsin’s narrow 
approach.11  Finally, it suggests that Wisconsin adopt an approach 
similar to that of a growing number of federal courts.12 
II. THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION 
“Since the early nineteenth century, the law of evidence has carved 
an ever broadening hearsay exception for records of regularly 
conducted activities.”13  “Widespread acceptance of [the] . . . exception 
followed a 1927 study that proposed” it be codified in every 
jurisdiction.14  The exception was included when Congress passed the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.15  “Today the business records 
exception is codified in virtually every jurisdiction, with most 
codifications patterned on [Rule] 803(6).”16  This rule describes records 
of a regularly conducted activity as 
 
8.  See id. ¶¶ 23, 26. 
9.  Compare infra Part II.B., with infra Part III. 
10.  See infra Part II. 
11.  See infra Parts III & IV. 
12.  See infra Part V. 
13.  7 DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN EVIDENCE 
§ 803.6, at 764 (3d ed. 2008) (“At its inception the rule was a relatively narrow ‘shop book’ 
exception that evolved into the broader ‘business records’ provision by the early twentieth 
century.  Reliability and convenience fueled the rule’s expansion.” (footnote omitted)). 
14.  Sidney Kwestel, The Business Records Exception to the Hearsay Rule—New Is Not 
Necessarily Better, 64 MO. L. REV. 595, 595 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
15.  Id. at 596. 
16.  Id. at 596–97 (footnote omitted). 
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a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if: (A) 
the record was made at or near the time by—or from 
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge; (B) the 
record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of 
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not 
for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of that 
activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of 
the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification 
that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute 
permitting certification; and (E) neither the source of 
information nor the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.17  
The rule was created because of the difficulty, and sometimes 
impossibility, of identifying and calling every person involved in creating 
business records.18  This exception, commonly known as the business 
records exception, comprises a data compilation made and kept in the 
ordinary course of business by a person with personal knowledge or 
from information supplied by a person with personal knowledge of the 
event at or near the time when the recorded event occurred.19   
Generally, hearsay exceptions, like the business records exception, 
“are based on some circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that is 
thought to warrant admissibility notwithstanding the lack of cross-
examination.”20  The basis for the business records exception is that the 
records are sufficiently reliable because they are systematically created, 
maintained, and relied upon by the entity for conducting business.21  
 
17.  FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
18.  CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO HEARSAY § 8.39 (2d ed. 1999) 
(“The necessity for such a rule is obvious.  It is often impractical and inconvenient, and 
sometimes impossible, to identify, let alone call as a witness, every person who participated in 
making a typical business record.”). 
19.  ANTHONY J. BOCCHINO & DAVID A. SONENSHEIN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE: OBJECTIONS, RESPONSES, RULES, AND PRACTICE COMMENTARY 218 
(7th ed. 2005). 
20.  PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 33.02 (2003) (emphasis 
omitted). 
21.  10 TED M. WARSHAFSKY, FRANK T. CRIVELLO II, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: 
TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN LAWYERS § 6:13, at 421 (3d ed. 2005) (“The rationale 
for the exception is that such records are sufficiently reliable due to the systematic checking 
of the records, the regularity with which they are kept, the reliance placed upon them by the 
enterprise or persons engaged in the activity, and the duty of the preparer to keep the records 
accurately.”). 
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Therefore, the exception is based on an assumption of self-interest; most 
businesses cannot operate without accurate records. 
The federal drafters echoed this rationale, writing that the 
reliability of business records “is said variously to be supplied by 
systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce 
habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying 
upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a 
continuing job or occupation.”22 
Because a business has a duty to create accurate records and 
consistently relies on such records to conduct business, there is an 
implicit guarantee of trustworthiness to the records.23  Triers of fact can 
rely on the records based upon the business’s reliance on the records, 
routine practice of creating the records, and duty to produce such 
records.24  Thus, “[t]he exception is premised on the notion that if the 
record is good enough to do business on, then it ought to be reliable 
enough for admissibility in court where issues regarding the business are 
litigated.”25  Following this reasoning, we see that “[t]he federal rules 
and practice favor the admission of evidence” of probative value rather 
than the exclusion of such evidence.26 
A. Requirements to Meet the Exception 
To qualify for the exception, records must meet several 
requirements.  The records can take almost any form and can even 
include opinions, as long as they meet the five statutory requirements.27 
 
22.  GIANNELLI, supra note 20, § 33.10[B] (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory 
committee’s note); see also BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 764 (“Reliability stemmed from 
the recording of recurring, relatively routine events by employees paid to keep track of them. 
Convenience inhered in the impracticality of requiring the proponent to produce all such 
employees, a burden unlikely to produce more accurate information than the record itself.”). 
23.  GIANNELLI, supra note 20, § 33.10[E] (“The trustworthiness guarantee that 
supports the exception is [the business duty requirement].”). 
24.  FISHMAN, supra note 18, § 8.39 (“The reliability of business records is based on 
three considerations: reliance, routine practice, and duty.”). 
25.  BOCCHINO & SONENSHEIN, supra note 19, at 219–20. 
26.  United States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 1977). 
27.  BOCCHINO & SONENSHEIN, supra note 19, at 218 (“A record of regularly conducted 
activity, known in common law as a business record, is a writing or data compilation which 
records activities or happenings, including opinions, which are made in the ordinary course of 
a regularly conducted activity, kept in the course of such activity, and created by or from a 
person with personal knowledge of the contents of the record, at or near the time of the event 
recorded.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
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First, the records must be made at or near the time of the recorded 
event by a person with knowledge of the event, or from information 
transmitted by a person with knowledge of the event.28  The entry does 
not have to be created by the person with knowledge.29  It is sufficient 
that the entry be created by another person via information provided by 
the person with knowledge.30  “This provision does not require that the 
‘person with knowledge’ be produced at trial or even identified.”31  
Rather, the phrase “person with knowledge” implies that it is enough 
for the party “to show that it was the regular practice of the activity to 
base such memorandums, reports, records, or data compilations upon a 
transmission from a person with knowledge.”32  
This leads to the second and third requirements—the record must be 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of the business, and 
the making of the record must have been a regular practice of that 
activity.33  Every codified version of the statute requires that the 
document be made in the regular course of business for the exception to 
apply.34  However, not every activity of a business is a regularly 
conducted activity.  For instance, “[i]f the activity is an irregular 
occurrence, or single transaction, records engendered thereby will not 
qualify for this exception to the hearsay rule.”35  This means that the 
entity must regularly conduct its business in the manner recorded, and 
the creation of the record must be a regular practice for the business.  
“If ‘the supplier of the information . . . does not act in the regular 
course, an essential link is broken; the assurance of accuracy does not 
extend to the information itself, and the fact that it may be recorded 
 
28.  FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(A). 
29.  DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK, 4TH, § 16:8, at 443 (2014–2015 ed. 2014)  
30.  Id. (“In short, the entry need not have been made by a person with knowledge, so 
long as the information was transmitted to the entrant, directly or indirectly, by a person with 
knowledge.”). 
31.  GIANNELLI, supra note 20, § 33.10[D], at 472. 
32.  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1237 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 
7063), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Products Antitrust Litig., 723 
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also FED. R. EVID. 803 (6)(B)–(C). 
33.  FED. R. EVID. 803 (6)(B)–(C). 
34.  Kwestel, supra note 14, at 602 (“Each codified version of the business records 
exception expressly conditions admissibility on a showing that the document was made in the 
regular course of business . . . .”). 
35.  BINDER, supra note 29, § 16:3, at 421.  
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with scrupulous accuracy is of no avail.’”36  The record making must be a 
regular practice.37 
The fourth requirement is that the first three requirements must be 
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.38  
This witness lays the foundation for the records and may be anyone with 
personal knowledge of how the records are created for the entity.39  
Accordingly, “The phrase ‘other qualified witness’ should be given the 
broadest interpretation; the witness need not be an employee of the 
entity so long as the witness understands the system.”40  Foundation for 
the records may also be laid in other ways.   
A foundation for admissibility may at times be predicated on 
judicial notice of the nature of the business and the nature of the 
records as observed by the court, particularly in the case of bank 
and similar statements.  Alternatively, the parties may stipulate 
that the records were filed and prepared in the regular course of 
business, or an admission of a party may establish that the 
records were ones of regularly conducted activity, or the records 
may be admissible pursuant to the residual hearsay exception of 
Rule 803(24).41 
Finally, the fifth requirement is that “neither the source of 
information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a 
lack of trustworthiness.”42  This allows for judicial discretion in applying 
the business records exception. 
 
36.  GIANNELLI, supra note 20, § 33.10[E] n.104 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory 
committee’s note). 
37.  Kwestel, supra note 14, at 603 (“Regularity of record making, therefore, is an 
integral part of the business records exception, regardless of the precise statutory language.”). 
38.  FED. R. EVID. 803 (6)(D). 
39.  G. MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 231 (2003) (“The sponsoring witness 
can be anyone who has first-hand knowledge of the routine record-keeping practices of the 
business activity in question.”); see also BINDER, supra note 29, § 16:11, at 463 (“[‘Other 
qualified witness’] has generally been interpreted to include, at the least, anyone who 
understands and can articulate the record making and record keeping system of the business 
or businesses involved.”). 
40.  Thomas P. Egan & Thomas J. Cunningham, Admission of Business Records into 
Evidence: Using the Business Records Exception and Other Techniques, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 205, 
212 (1992). 
41.  Id. at 212–13 (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803(06)[2], at 178–79 (Matthew Bender & Co.1990)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
42.  FED. R. EVID. 803 (6)(E). 
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B. The Federal Business Records Exception and Third-Party Records 
In applying the business records exception to entities submitting 
third-party records, federal courts have taken a broad view of the 
exception.43  It appears there is “[a] growing circuit consensus 
suggest[ing] that the . . . business record exception to the hearsay rule 
can easily incorporate records maintained by a third party.”44 
As part of this broad approach to the exception, some courts are 
requiring less of a foundational showing in certain contexts.45  For 
example, in United States v. Johnson, a man convicted of money 
laundering argued that the district court erred by admitting into 
evidence bank receipts that reflected money transfers to and from the 
defendant because the receipts were admitted through the testimony of 
the individual investors that had received the receipts and not the 
custodian of records from the bank.46  On appeal, the defendant argued 
that the individuals were not qualified witnesses under the business 
records exception, thus the transfers lacked foundation.47   
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, stating first that the decision to admit 
or exclude evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and therefore 
receives a high level of deference.48  The court reasoned that “[a] 
foundation for admissibility may at times be predicated on judicial 
notice of the nature of the business and the nature of the records as 
observed by the court, particularly in the case of bank and similar 
statements.”49  The court reviewed the record as a whole and found that 
the circumstances surrounding the transactions demonstrated that the 
records were trustworthy.50  Further, the court stated that  
 
43.  See infra Part II.B. 
44.  Applying the FRE 803(6) Business Records Exception to Third Party Record 
Keepers, FED. EVIDENCE REV. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2013/august/
third-party-record-keepers-under-fre-8036-business-records-exception, archived at http://per
ma.cc/E3GU-KTLU. 
45.  See Conoco Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 99 F.3d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992). 
46.  Johnson, 971 F.2d at 570–71. 
47.  Id. at 571. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Staudinger, 797 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50.  Id. (“The record is replete with circumstances demonstrating the trustworthiness of 
the documents.  There is simply no dispute that the transactions shown by the receipts took 
place as recorded.”). 
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bank records are particularly suitable for admission under Rule 
803(6) in light of the fastidious nature of record keeping in 
financial institutions, which is often required by governmental 
regulation.  The nature of the documents themselves as bank 
statements together with the testimony of the investors 
established that the records were made at the time of the 
transactions in question and were made in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity.51 
In Johnson, the foundation for the third-party records was laid by 
the circumstances surrounding the records more so than by the 
individuals that testified regarding the records.52  It therefore appears 
that a sufficient foundation for the documents “depends in part on the 
nature of the documents at issue.  Documents that are standard records 
of the type regularly maintained by firms in a particular industry may 
require less by way of foundation testimony than less conventional 
documents proffered for admission as business records.”53 
Another example of relaxed foundational requirements is found in 
Residential Funding Co. v. Terrace Mortgage Co.54  In that case, 
Residential Funding sued Terrace Mortgage for breach of contract when 
Terrace “refused to repurchase thirteen loans Residential had 
purchased from Terrace.”55  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Residential.56  In appealing the decision, one of the 
issues raised by Terrace was the award of damages based upon third-
party records.57  Terrace alleged inconsistencies regarding when the 
records were created and further argued that Residential did not create 
all the records itself.58  In rejecting Terrace’s argument, the Eighth 
Circuit declared that “a record created by a third party and used as part 
 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 572 (“In short, the record as a whole shows a sufficient foundation for the 
admission of the documents under Rule 803(6).  Under the circumstances, the investors were 
‘qualified witness[es]’ whose testimony, together with the other evidence, was sufficient to 
show a foundation for the admission of the documents.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted)). 
53.  5 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, JACK B. WEINSTEIN, & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.08[8][a] (2d ed. 2009), as quoted in State v. 
Fitzwater, 227 P.2d 520, 532 (Haw. 2010). 
54.  725 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2013). 
55.  Id. at 913. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 920. 
58.  Id. at 921. 
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of another entity’s records meets the business records exception, so long 
as the entity relied on the accuracy of that record and the remaining 
requirements of Rule 803(6) are met.”59  The Residential Funding court 
relied on Brawner v. Allstate Indemnity Co., which was issued only three 
years earlier.60  In Brawner, the Eighth Circuit addressed the question of 
the use of third-party records for the first time: 
Although this court has not addressed the precise argument 
raised here by the Brawners, we have established that the 
“custodian or other qualified witness need not have personal 
knowledge regarding the creation of the document offered, or 
personally participate in its creation, or even know who actually 
recorded the information.”  Several other courts have held that a 
record created by a third party and integrated into another 
entity’s records is admissible as the record of the custodian 
entity, so long as the custodian entity relied upon the accuracy of 
the record and the other requirements of Rule 803(6) are 
satisfied.61 
In that case, Allstate was not required to produce a representative of 
the third party that created the records it relied on to establish a 
foundation for admission of the documents.62  Rather, the court held 
that third-party records that are integrated into the records of another 
entity are admissible as a record of the entity that integrated them, so 
long as the integrating entity relied on the record’s accuracy and the 
other requirements of Rule 803(6) are satisfied.63  
As these cases demonstrate, federal courts have found that “[a] 
business record that is created by one business, but is thereafter 
obtained and kept by a second business, is often qualified by a custodian 
from the second business.”64  As referenced in Brawner, the Eighth 
Circuit is not the only federal jurisdiction to base the foundation for 
admission of third-party records into evidence on a business’s reliance 
 
59.  Id. (citing Brawner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 591 F.3d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
60.  Id. 
61.  Brawner, 591 F.3d at 987 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 
1132 (8th Cir. 1994)) (citing United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602–03 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id.; see also Don Zupanec, Evidence—Third Party Business Records—Admissibility, 
25 FED. LITIGATOR 12 (2010). 
64.  BINDER, supra note 29, § 16:11, at 469–70 (citing United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 
628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp., 665 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 
668, 670–71 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
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on the records.65  In United States v. Duncan, the Fifth Circuit addressed 
the issue.66  There the defendant claimed the trial court had erred in 
admitting records of insurance companies into evidence.67  The Fifth 
Circuit disagreed, finding that there is neither a “requirement that the 
witness who lays the foundation  . . . of the record . . . be able to 
personally attest to the record’s accuracy,”68 nor a requirement that the 
record be created by the entity having custody of the records.69  Rather, 
the court stated that the emphasis of the business records exception is 
on “reliability or trustworthiness of the records sought to be 
introduced.”70  Accordingly, district courts should be afforded deference 
in exercising discretion as to trustworthiness.71  Other circuits have 
taken similar approaches, and district and state courts outside these 
circuits have followed suit.72  Wisconsin has not. 
 
65.  Brawner, 591 F.3d at 987. 
66.  United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 985–87 (5th Cir. 1990). 
67.  Id. at 985. 
68.  Id. at 986 (citing United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 119–20 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
69.  Id. (citing Miss. River Grain Elevator, Inc. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain, 659 F.2d 1314, 
1319 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981); United States v. Veytia-Bravo, 603 F.2d 1187, 1189 (5th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1024 (1980)). 
70.  Id. (quoting Veytia-Bravo, 603 F.2d at 1189) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
71.  Id. 
72.  See, e.g., United States v. Adefehinti, 510 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2007), judgment 
entered, 264 F. App’x 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Further, several courts have found that a record of 
which a firm takes custody is thereby ‘made’ by the firm within the meaning of the rule (and 
thus is admissible if all the other requirements are satisfied).  We join those courts.”); Air 
Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 172 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[Third-party] 
testimony is not necessary where an organization incorporated the records of another entity 
into its own, relied upon those records in its day-to-day operations, and where there are other 
strong indicia of reliability.”); In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., No.11–37867–BKC–AJC, 2012 
WL 3564014, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Absent specific evidence of an error in 
the prior servicer’s records, the Court finds that [a party’s] practice of relying on and 
integrating into [its] own records the records and information of a prior loan servicer is 
appropriate.”); BP Amoco Chem. Co. v. Flint Hills Res., LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1021 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (“A document prepared by a third party may qualify as another business 
entity’s business record under Rule 803(6) if that entity integrated the third-party record into 
its records and relied upon it in its day-to-day operations. The proponent also must satisfy the 
other requirements of Rule 803(6).”); Pizza Corner, Inc. v. C.F.L. Transp., Inc., 792 N.W.2d 
911, 915 (N.D. 2010) (“Several courts have held a witness from one company can provide the 
foundation for a record created by a third party if that company integrated the record into its 
own records and relied on it, and if the record meets the other requirements of Rule 
803(6). . . .  We adopt the position of these courts.”).  
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III. THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION 
Wisconsin is not among those jurisdictions that have taken a broader 
view of the business records exception when it comes to admissibility.73  
Rather, Wisconsin seems to have stuck to the letter of the law.74  This 
approach has not yielded positive results in many cases.75 
A. The Requirements of the Business Records Exception in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin Statute section 908.03(6) lays out the business records 
exception in Wisconsin.  The language of the Wisconsin business records 
exception tracks closely with the business records exception in the 
federal rules.76  Wisconsin Statute section 908.03(6) states:  
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at 
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person 
with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted 
activity, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with s. 
909.02(12) or (13), or a statute permitting certification, unless the 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.77 
Before a document can be admitted into evidence, it must meet seven 
requirements.78  The first two requirements are that the document must 
fall within the definition of a writing listed under the statute and must 
 
73.  See infra Part III. 
74.  See infra Part III. 
75.  See, e.g., infra notes 102–20 and accompanying text. 
76.  Compare WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6) (2013–2014), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
77.  WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6). 
78.  See id.; see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, at 421–22 (“The 
specific requirements which must be met before a writing or document will be admitted into 
evidence pursuant to the regularly conducted activity exception to the hearsay rule are that: 
(1) it must consist of a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any form; (2) it 
must record acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (3) it must have been prepared at 
or near the time of the act, event, condition, etc., which it records; (4) it must have been 
prepared by a person with personal knowledge of the recorded item, or from information 
transmitted by such a person; (5) the recording of the act, event, condition, etc. and the 
transmission of information by the person with knowledge, where such is the case, must occur 
in the course of a regularly conducted activity; (6) these requirements must be established 
through the testimony of a custodian of the writing or document or other qualified witness; 
and (7) the sources of information or other circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
writing or document must not otherwise indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”). 
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record applicable information.79  These two requirements are relatively 
easy to satisfy because of the broad categorical language with which the 
statute is drafted.80  The third requirement is that the record be created 
at or near the time of the instance recorded.81  The timing requirement is 
dependent on the circumstances, with the key inquiry being whether too 
much time has elapsed for the record to be accurate.82  Fourth, the 
record must be created from personal knowledge.83  Fifth, the record 
must be created in the course of a regularly conducted activity.84  In 
other words, the entity must be in the regular practice of creating such 
records.85  The sixth requirement is that the foundation must be laid by 
the record custodian or other qualified witness.86  The essential question 
related to the qualified witness requirement is whether the witness is 
familiar with how the records were created.87  Finally, the court must 
deem the record trustworthy.88  This means that even if all the other 
elements of the exception are met, the judge may still exclude the 
 
79.  WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, at 421.  
80.  See BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 765 (“The rule embraces ‘records’ regardless 
of form, including memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations ‘in any form.’  
Computer generated records are expressly within the rule, regardless of whether they exist in 
electronic form (stored by computer software) or as ‘hardcopy.’”); see also 3B JAY E. GRENIG 
& DANIEL D. BLINKA, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN CIVIL RULES 
HANDBOOK § 908.03:6 (2014 ed. 2014) (“The records, etc. can take literally ‘any form.’  
Computer-generated records are expressly within the rule.”). 
81.  WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6); see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, 
at 421. 
82.  BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 767 (“The key is whether the time span creates a 
significant danger of distortion or inaccuracy, yet a lengthy or unexplained delay also suggests 
a troubling lack of regularity.  The permissible length of elapsed time will depend upon the 
nature of the underlying activity, the record keeping procedures, and the facts of the case.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
83.  WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6); see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, 
at 421. 
84.  WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6); see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, 
at 421–22. 
85.  BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 769 (“There must be some indication that the 
record of the event is one that is ‘regularly’ prepared.  The regularity of the record should not 
be confused with the frequency with which the event occurs.  The key is whether an employee 
has an obligation or ‘business duty’ to observe and to report the matters described in the 
record, regardless of how often they recur.”). 
86.  WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6); see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, § 16:13, 
at 422. 
87.  BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 771 (“The important factor is whether the witness 
is familiar with how records of this type are prepared by the organization.”). 
88.  See WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6); see also WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 21, 
§ 16:13, at 422. 
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evidence.89  Wisconsin courts’ application of the foundational 
requirement will be the focus of our discussion going forward.  
B. The Business Records Exception and Reliance on Third-Party 
Records in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s interpretation and application of the business records 
exception, where a party relies on third-party records, is laid out in 
Palisades Collection LLC v. Kalal.90  In Palisades, the defendants, Ralph 
and Jackie Kalal, appealed the circuit court’s grant of summary 
judgment “that they owe[d] Palisades Collection LLC $27,343.47, plus 
costs, for the balance due on Jackie Kalal’s credit card account with 
Chase Manhattan Bank.”91  Palisades had purchased the debt from 
Chase and, after unsuccessful attempts to collect on the debt, filed a 
complaint as the holder of the credit account.92  The Kalals’ answer 
denied the allegations and Palisades moved for summary judgment.93 
Supporting Palisades’ motion for summary judgment was an affidavit 
from Marie Oliphant.94  In the affidavit, Oliphant averred that “she was 
‘a duly authorized representative’” of Palisades, that Palisades owned 
the account, and that the documents accompanying her affidavit were 
“true and correct” copies of the credit card statements mailed to Jackie 
Kalal.95  Attached to the affidavit were five pages titled “Chase . . . 
MasterCard Account Summary” that “identifie[d] Jackie Kalal as the 
cardholder, and state[d] amounts due for the time periods identified.”96 
Oliphant’s affidavit further stated that, in her capacity as Palisades’ 
authorized representative, she had “control over and access to records 
regarding the account.”97  She further stated that the original owner of 
the account 
 
89.  BLINKA, supra note 13, § 803.6, at 772 (“Hearsay that satisfies the foundational 
elements of Wis.Stat. § 908.03(6) is not automatically admissible.  The trial judge has the 
power to exclude the evidence where the ‘sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness.’”). 
90.  2010 WI App 38, 324 Wis. 2d 180, 781 N.W.2d 503. 
91.  Id. ¶ 1. 
92.  Id. ¶ 3. 
93.  Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
94.  Id. ¶ 4. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. ¶ 5. 
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maintained records pertaining to its business [and] that the 
records were prepared in the ordinary course of business, at or 
near the time of the transaction or event, by a person with 
knowledge of the event or transaction, that such records are kept 
in the ordinary course of the original creditor’s business and that 
of the Plaintiff.98  
Oliphant also stated she had personally reviewed the records and 
statements regarding the account balance.99 
In opposing the summary judgment motion, “the Kalals asserted that 
the affidavit did not show that Oliphant had personal knowledge of the 
amount owed and the attached documents were inadmissible to show 
that amount because the affidavit did not establish the foundation 
requirements of . . . the hearsay exception for records of regularly 
conducted activity.”100  Essentially, the Kalals argued Oliphant was not a 
qualified witness.  The Dane County Circuit Court rejected the 
argument and granted Palisades’ summary judgment motion, finding 
Oliphant’s affidavit demonstrated personal knowledge and the records 
were admissible.101  The Kalals appealed the circuit court’s judgment. 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Oliphant’s 
affidavit could not reasonably be viewed to “show that she is qualified to 
testify that (1) the records were made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge; and (2) this was 
done in the course of a regularly conducted activity.”102  The court of 
appeals relied on Bergzimmer and Associates, Inc. v. Central 
Manufacturing Corp.103 
In Bergzimmer, the court concluded that “a manager for a company 
that had paid a supplier was not a qualified witness with respect to 
invoices and supporting documentation prepared by the supplier.”104  
The manager testified that “he had reviewed the invoices and 
supporting documentation, separated out certain charges, and totaled 
those.”105  The court in Bergzimmer found that manager could not be a 
 
98.  Id.  
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. ¶ 6. 
101.  See id. ¶ 7. 
102.  Id. ¶ 15. 
103.  Id. ¶¶ 16–17 (citing Berg-Zimmer & Assocs., Inc. v. Cent. Mfg. Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 
341, 434 N.W.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
104.  Id. ¶ 16 (citing Berg-Zimmer, 148 Wis. 2d at 348–50). 
105.  Id. ¶ 16 (citing Berg-Zimmer, 148 Wis. 2d at 350). 
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qualified witness because “[h]e did not possess knowledge to testify 
concerning the contemporaneousness of the entries, by whom they were 
transmitted or whether they were made in the course of a regularly 
conducted activity.”106  It was not enough for the manager to have 
possession of the records and understand their contents.107 
The basis for the court’s decision in Bergzimmer regarding what 
constitutes a qualified witness “was that the witness was not qualified to 
testify on how the invoices and supporting documentation were 
prepared.”108  The Palisades court followed this reasoning, stating that, 
while it is unnecessary for the affiant to be the originator of the records,  
under the plain language of this exception, being a present 
custodian of the records is not sufficient.  The language is “as 
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness.”  The only reasonable reading of this language is that a 
testifying custodian must be qualified to testify that the records 
(1) were made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge; and (2) that this was 
done in the course of a regularly conducted activity.109 
Without knowledge of how the records were made, the witness is not 
qualified to testify that the records “were made ‘at or near the time [of 
the event] by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge’ and ‘in the course of a regularly conducted activity.’”110 
Applying this reasoning to the Oliphant affidavit, the court of 
appeals in Palisades stated that for Oliphant to be a qualified witness 
she must have “personal knowledge of how the account statements were 
prepared and that they were prepared in the ordinary course of Chase’s 
business.”111  In reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, 
the court reasoned that “[t]he averment that [Oliphant], as a 
representative of Palisades, now has control over the records of Jackie 
Kalal’s accounts and has ‘personally inspected said account and 
statements regarding the balance due,’ does not reasonably imply that 
 
106.  Berg-Zimmer, 148 Wis. 2d at 350–51. 
107.  See id. 
108.  Palisades, 2010 WI App 38, ¶ 19. 
109.  Id. ¶ 20 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6) (2013–2014)). 
110.  Id. ¶ 22  (alteration in original) (quoting WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6)). 
111.  Id. ¶ 21. 
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she has personal knowledge of how Chase prepared the account 
statements.”112 
Palisades and subsequent cases have helped to spell out what is 
required of a party that wishes to successfully rely on third-party 
records.113  Unfortunately, parties have had trouble laying a foundation 
under the Wisconsin rule.  In Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2010A v. 
Gartland, Gartland appealed the grant of summary judgment to Arch 
Bay—the successor in interest to his mortgage.114  To support its motion 
for summary judgment, Arch Bay submitted an affidavit from Susan 
Ceduc.115  Ceduc was neither an employee of Arch Bay nor of GMAC, 
the original debt holder.116  Rather, she worked as “Contested 
Foreclosure Liaison” for a third party.117  Ceduc’s affidavit stated that 
“‘as a custodian of the businesses records’ [she] has ‘possession, control, 
and responsibility for the accounting and other mortgage loan records 
relating to the defendants’ mortgage loan[,]’ including those records 
attached to the affidavit.”118  Further, Ceduc averred she had personally 
inspected the records and that she had personal knowledge of how the 
records were created and maintained.119  In reversing the circuit court, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Ceduc’s affidavit did not meet 
the qualified witness requirement because it did not state facts that 
showed she had personal knowledge of how the records were prepared 
or that the records were prepared in the ordinary course of GMAC’s 
business.120   
Similarly, in Bank of America N.A. v. Minkov, Bank of America 
filed the foreclosure action as “‘the loan servicer which collects and 
tracks payments . . . and pursues legal action when necessary,’ for the 
Bank of New York which ‘[was] the current mortgagee of record.’”121  
The Bank of New York was a successor in interest to the mortgage.122  
 
112.  Id. ¶ 23. 
113.  See supra notes 90–112 and accompanying text. 
114.  Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2010A v. Gartland, 2012AP756-FT, slip op. ¶¶ 1–2 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012). 
115.  Id. ¶ 3. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. ¶ 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Affidavit of Susan Ceduc). 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. ¶ 10. 
121.  Bank of Am. N.A. v. Minkov, No. 2012AP2643, slip op. ¶ 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting Complaint of the Plaintiff–Respondent). 
122.  Id. ¶ 3. 
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Bank of America moved for summary judgment, supporting its motion 
with two affidavits, both from Bank of America employees—Russell 
Karnes and Eileen Thiry.123  Only the Thiry affidavit is relevant for our 
discussion. 
The Thiry affidavit stated that Thiry was an officer of Bank of 
America and that Bank of America was the servicing agent of the 
mortgage.124  She also averred that Bank of New York was the current 
note holder; that Bank of America was the servicer of the loan, had 
permission to act on Bank of New York’s behalf, and maintained the 
records of the loan; and that it was her responsibility to be “familiar with 
the type of records maintained by [Bank of America] in connection with 
the loan.”125  Further, the affidavit stated, 
The information in this affidavit is taken from BANA’s business 
records.  I have personal knowledge of BANA’s procedures for 
creating these records.  They are: (a) made at or near the time of 
the occurrence of the matters recorded by persons with personal 
knowledge of the information in the business record, or from 
information transmitted by persons with personal knowledge; (b) 
kept in the course of BANA’s regularly conducted business 
activities; and (c) it is the regular practice of BANA to make 
such records.126 
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Minkov argued Thiry 
was not a qualified witness.127  The Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
granted Bank of America’s motion.128 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagreed, reversing the circuit 
court.129  The court held that Thiry failed to present any facts that would 
show she had personal knowledge of how the records were created.130  
The court declared that it is not enough to parrot the requirements of 
the statute and draw legal conclusions.131  In the court’s view, it was not 
enough for Thiry to know how Bank of America’s records were created 
 
123.  Id. ¶ 4. 
124.  Id. ¶ 7. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. (quoting Affidavit of Eileen Thiry). 
127.  Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. 
128.  Id. ¶ 10. 
129.  Id. ¶ 40. 
130.  Id. ¶ 33. 
131.  Id. ¶ 38. 
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and maintained.132  Rather, she must have knowledge of how the two 
previous debt holders’ records were created and maintained.133   
As the cases above demonstrate, the requirements of the Wisconsin 
records exception can be easily spelled out in theory, but meeting the 
requirements can prove difficult.  Such examples raise the question of 
whether the current application of the records exception serves the 
purpose it was intended to serve. 
IV. ISSUES WITH WISCONSIN’S BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION 
The Wisconsin business records exception—specifically the narrow 
interpretation of the foundation requirements as it pertains to third-
party records—has led to an application of the rule inconsistent with the 
purpose of the exception.134  This application frustrates summary 
judgment proceedings and results in harmful inefficiencies that 
overburden the courts and impose undue delay and cost to the 
litigants.135 
A. Wisconsin’s Application of the Business Records Exception 
Contravenes the Purpose of the Exception 
Wisconsin courts have stated that “the rules of evidence favor 
making relevant evidence available to the trier of fact.”136  The business 
records exception was created because records that were regularly relied 
on for business purposes were deemed trustworthy enough to be relied 
on for litigation purposes as well.137  The consistent theme of the stated 
purposes of the business records exception is admission of relevant 
evidence for the sake of fairness and efficiency.138  According to the 
 
132.  Id. ¶¶ 35–36. 
133.  Id. ¶ 35 (“Thiry does not aver that she had personal knowledge as to the previous 
mortgagees’ (Intervale and Decision One) record-keeping practices.  Nor would it likely be 
possible for Thiry to make such an averment, because she, at least as an employee of Bank of 
America, would be expected to be familiar with the records only since the time Bank of New 
York acquired the note and mortgage and Bank of America commenced its role as servicer 
for that loan.” (citation omitted)). 
134.  Compare supra notes 20–26, with notes 102–20 and accompanying text. 
135.  See infra Part IV.B. 
136.  Kuhlman, Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 83 Wis. 2d 749, 762–63, 266 N.W.2d 
382, 389 (1978). 
137.  See supra Part II. 
138.  See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 2010) (commenting that 
the purpose of the business records exception was to avoid the falsification of documents and 
avoid a party creating records for the sole purpose of litigation). 
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Seventh Circuit, the purpose of the business records exception is “to 
permit the admission of records maintained in the regular course of 
business, unless ‘the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.’”139  
Other courts have stated that the purpose of the exception is to broaden 
the sphere of admissible relevant evidence,140 to ensure that the 
documents were not prepared for personal use or in preparation for 
litigation,141 and to allow business records to be considered by the court 
without requiring firsthand testimony.142  Wisconsin’s overzealous 
foundation requirement for parties relying on third-party evidence 
creates an application of the exception inconsistent with this purpose.  
Wisconsin’s approach to the business records exception also has 
negative procedural effects. 
B. Wisconsin’s Application of the Business Records Exception Frustrates 
Summary Judgment Proceedings 
In Wisconsin, “[t]he well-established purpose of summary judgment 
procedure is to determine the existence of genuine factual disputes in 
order to ‘avoid trials where there is nothing to try.’”143  Summary 
judgment is granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
 
139.  Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 549 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting United 
States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
140.  Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC v. Kumbaris, No. DC–23345–10, 2011 WL 6057861, 
at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2011) (“The purpose of the business records 
exception is to ‘broaden the area of admissibility of relevant evidence where there is necessity 
and sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness.’” (quoting Liptak v. Rite Aid, Inc.,  673 A.2d 309, 
319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996))). 
141.  Kaiser, 609 F.3d at  574 (“The purpose of the rule is to ensure that documents were 
not created for ‘personal purpose[s] . . . or in anticipation of any litigation’ so that the creator 
of the document ‘had no motive to falsify the record in question.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
142.  Beneficial Maine Inc. v. Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶ 12, 25 A.3d 96, 101 (“[T]he purpose 
underlying the business records exception to the hearsay rule [is] to allow the consideration of 
a business record, without requiring firsthand testimony regarding the recorded facts.”). 
143.  Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74 ¶ 10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102 (quoting 
Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752, 
757 (1981); Caulfield v. Caulfield, 183 Wis. 2d 83, 91, 515 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Ct. App. 1994)); 
see also 12 ROBERT A. PASCH, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN COLLECTION 
LAW § 6:23, at 180 (2d ed. 2006) (“The primary object of the statutes providing for summary 
judgment is to discourage dilatory pleading and practice, and to avoid delay and injustice.  
Summary judgment serves to end litigation when no triable issue exists in the pending 
action.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Sullivan v. State, 213 Wis. 185, 251 N.W. 251 (1933))). 
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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”144  
Summary judgment is an instrument of judicial discretion and not a right 
of the parties.145  As such, “[s]ummary judgment is a useful tool for the 
promotion of efficiency in the administration of justice, since it can be 
used to prevent sham pleadings and delay and to terminate the case on 
its merits.”146  When considering a motion for summary judgment, courts 
first examine the moving papers and documents to determine 
whether the moving party has made a prima facie case for 
summary judgment under sec. 270.635(2), Stats., and if he has, 
[courts] then examine the opposing party’s affidavits and other 
proof to determine whether facts are shown which the court 
deems sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial.  If the 
material facts are not in dispute and if the inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from the facts are not doubtful and lead 
only to one conclusion, then there is presented only a matter of 
law, which should be decided upon the motion.147 
In the context of parties that rely on third-party records to prove 
debt, summary judgment is appropriate where the party can establish a 
prima facie case for the validity of the debt.148  This can often only be 
done using the third-party records.149  Wisconsin sets the bar too high by 
requiring a person with personal knowledge of how records purchased 
from a third party were created by the third party in order to lay the 
foundation for the records.  Because the evidentiary standard for 
foundation for the records is so high, summary judgment is often out of 
reach when it should not be.  The result is inefficiency that harms our 
 
144.  WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) (2013–2014). 
145.  Wozniak v. Local No. 1111 of the United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am., 
45 Wis. 2d 588, 592, 173 N.W.2d 596, 598 (1970) (“Summary judgment is not a matter of right, 
and a trial court may deny summary judgment if it determines that the opposite side is 
entitled to a trial.”); Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 240, 172 N.W.2d 
812, 815 (1969) (“Summary judgment is not an absolute right nor a ‘short cut to avoid a trial 
and to obtain quick relief at the expense of a searching determination for the truth.’” (quoting 
Schandelmeier v. Brown, 37 Wis. 2d 656, 658, 155 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1968))); Zimmer v. Daun, 
40 Wis. 2d 627, 630, 162 N.W.2d 626, 627 (1968) (“A trial court need not decide a question of 
law on a motion for summary judgment . . . even though no conflict of material facts exists.  
There is no absolute right to summary judgment.”). 
146.  Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 350–51, 195 N.W.2d 602, 605 (1972). 
147.  Caraway v. Leathers, 58 Wis. 2d 321, 325–26, 206 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1973). 
148.  See id. 
149.  See Beneficial Maine Inc. v. Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶¶ 5, 7, 11–13, 25 A.3d 96, 
99−101. 
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courts and the parties involved.  It costs the courts and the litigants 
unnecessary time, money, and energy.  Such a result is harmfully 
inefficient.  It is time to consider a different approach to the records 
exception. 
V. CHANGING WISCONSIN’S APPROACH 
The Wisconsin and federal records exceptions are extremely similar 
in language and requirement.150  However, the two court systems have 
interpreted the statutory language differently.151  Wisconsin’s approach 
in successors-in-interest litigation has created harmful inefficiencies.152  
These inefficiencies could be remedied by reinterpreting the Wisconsin 
business records exception, aligning it more closely with the approach of 
some federal courts.153 
A. Comparing the Statutory Language 
The Wisconsin records exception is nearly identical to the federal 
exception.  First, both jurisdictions require the record to be created at or 
near the time of the event by a person with knowledge of the event or 
from information transmitted by a person with knowledge of the 
event.154  Second, both rules require that the making and keeping of such 
records must be part of the regularly conducted activity of the 
business.155  Third, both rules require that the custodian of the records or 
other qualified witness must testify that the first two elements of the 
exception exist.156  Finally, both rules provide for judicial discretion as to 
the trustworthiness of the records.157  When considering the 
trustworthiness of the records, a judge may take into account the source 
of the information and other circumstances regarding the records 
 
150.  Compare WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6) (2013–2014), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
151.  Compare supra Part III, with supra Part II. 
152.  Supra Part IV. 
153.  See infra Part V.B. 
154.  Compare § 908.03(6), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(A). 
155.  Compare § 908.03(6), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B)–(C).  Rule 803(6) also adds 
“an additional requirement—that it was the regular practice of the business to make the 
document.”  Kwestel, supra note 14, at 602. 
156.  Compare § 908.03(6), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(D). 
157.  Compare § 908.03(6), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E). 
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creation.158  However, despite these similarities between the two records 
exceptions, discrepancies exist in interpretation and application.159 
B. Changing the Approach 
Because Wisconsin’s foundational requirement in the context of 
third-party records produces an application of the exception that is 
inconsistent with the exception’s purpose and causes harmful 
inefficiency, the Wisconsin courts should adopt an approach more like 
that of the federal courts in the cases discussed above.160  The 
foundational standard for third-party records should require that the 
records be integrated into the entity’s own records, and the entity should 
be required to show it has a regular practice of buying, integrating, and 
relying on the records.161   
The seeds for such a change may already exist in Wisconsin case law.  
In Central Prairie Financial LLC v. Yang, Yang appealed “from a 
summary judgment granted in favor of Central Prairie Financial LLC, 
the company that own[ed] Yang’s indebtedness on a credit card account 
formerly owned by Chase Bank USA, N.A.”162  Yang’s central argument 
on appeal was that the case should be “controlled by Palisades” and that 
the trial court erred.163 
Like Palisades Collection,164 Central Prairie Financial purchased the 
debt from Chase and attempted to collect on the debt through the 
courts.165  After Yang’s answer to the complaint failed to address the 
claims, Central Prairie Financial moved for summary judgment.166  
Accompanying the summary judgment motion was an affidavit from 
Central Prairie’s records custodian.167  In the affidavit the records 
custodian averred that  
 
158.  See § 908.03(6); FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E). 
159.  Compare supra Part III, with supra Part II. 
160.  See supra notes 45–72 and accompanying text. 
161.  See infra notes 176–191 and accompanying text. 
162.  Cent. Prairie Fin. LLC v. Yang, 2013 WI App 82, ¶ 1, 348 Wis. 2d 583, 833 N.W.2d 
866. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Palisades Collection LLC v. Kalal, 2010 WI App 38, ¶¶ 3–4, 324 Wis. 2d 180, 781 
N.W.2d 503. 
165.  Cent. Prairie, 2013 WI App 82, ¶¶ 1, 2. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. ¶ 2. 
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Central Prairie’s business practices included purchasing 
defaulted credit card accounts from Chase Bank, that in such 
purchases Central Prairie obtains and integrates Chase’s 
electronic records of those accounts into Central Prairie’s own 
business records, and that review of those regularly kept records 
reflected that Yang was issued a credit card by Chase, failed to 
make payments and therefore defaulted on the terms of the 
Cardmember Agreement, and that Central Prairie thereafter 
acquired “all right and title” in Yang’s account.168 
Yang responded to the motion by arguing that Central Prairie 
Financial’s records custodian did not have personal knowledge of how 
Chase Bank USA created the records and, under Palisades, the court 
should deny the summary judgment motion.169  In reply, Central 
Financial argued that Palisades did not apply because Central Prairie 
Financial had produced affidavits from previous account holders 
attesting to the accuracy of the records and that the “‘records relating to 
Defendant’s Account were transmitted by a person [with] personal 
knowledge in the regular course of a regularly conducted activity, a sale 
of a debt,’ and thus were admissible evidence.”170  
In its analysis, the court distinguished Palisades, stating that it 
“stands for the extremely narrow proposition that the hearsay exception 
for business records is not established when the only affiant concerning 
the records in question lacks personal knowledge of how the records 
were made.”171  The court noted that here, unlike in Palisades, there are 
multiple affidavits authenticating the records provided.172 
The court then distinguished the case from Palisades in another, 
potentially more substantial way.  The court pointed out that  
the affidavit of Central Prairie’s own record custodian confirms 
his personal knowledge of Central Prairie’s regular practice of 
purchasing defaulted Chase accounts and receiving transmission 
of “electronic account information at the time the accounts are 
assigned,” along with the terms and conditions and account 
 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. ¶ 3. 
170.  Id. ¶ 3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
171.  Id. ¶ 9. 
172.  Id. ¶ 10 (“Here, in stark contrast, Central Prairie has produced documentation to 
validate the existence and amount of the indebtedness under a contract with the original 
creditor, Chase, and the transactions by which that indebtedness (and records of it) was 
assigned to Central Prairie.”). 
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statements, which records are regularly “integrated . . . from 
Chase Bank USA, N.A. into [Central Prairie’s] own business 
records.”173  
In the court’s view, “[t]his aspect alone, the custodian’s explanation of 
the regular processes by which Chase’s electronic account records are 
transmitted to its assignees, already differentiates this case from 
Palisades.”174   
The reasoning behind the court’s finding that Central Prairie’s 
record custodian had personal knowledge is significant.  The court noted 
it was the record custodian’s knowledge of the company’s practice of 
purchasing defaulted accounts, receiving the account information 
electronically, and then integrating the information into Central 
Prairie’s business records that gave the custodian the requisite personal 
knowledge under the exception.175  This suggests that Central Prairie’s 
records met the exception, even though the records incorporated the 
Chase records.  While such a reading of the exception would not allow a 
successor in interest to bring the original debt holder’s records before 
the court, it would allow the successor in interest to stand on its own 
records alone.  This seems to suggest openness to another, similar 
argument found in Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States.176  
In Air Land Forwarders, the appellants were movers contracted to 
provide door-to-door moving services for members of the military.177  
Once the move was complete, the carrier would provide a document for 
a damage assessment.178  If a service member’s property was damaged in 
the move, he or she would submit a claim to the military claims office.179  
To support the claim, the service member could include repair estimates 
from third parties or receipts to prove the value of the damaged or lost 
property.180  The military would compensate the service member and 
seek reimbursement from the carrier.181  If the carrier did not respond or 
 
173.  Id. ¶ 10 (alteration in original). 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. ¶¶ 10, 13. 
176.  172 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
177.  Id. at 1340. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
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no settlement was reached, the military would set off the amount 
demanded against payments due the carrier for other shipments.182   
In the case, Air Land Forwarders sought a refund for some of the 
offsets.183  On appeal “[t]he carriers argue[d] that the offsets not 
refunded were supported at trial by hearsay repair estimates made by 
third parties that were improperly admitted into evidence under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(6).”184  Air Land Forwarders argued that the 
requirements for admissibility under Rule 803(6) were not met because 
the qualifying witness could not testify that “(1) the estimates had been 
prepared by persons with first hand knowledge of the damage; (2) the 
preparer of the estimate was engaged in the regular business of 
repairing damaged goods; and (3) the preparer provided estimates as 
part of a regular business activity.”185 
The government offered an alternative argument.186  It proposed that 
the district court did not admit the documents as business records of the 
various repair shops; rather, the government argued that “the entire 
claims files were properly admitted under 803(6) as the ‘business 
records’ of the military . . . and as a whole constituted records of the 
regularly conducted activity of adjudicating a service member’s 
claim.”187  Thus, the government contended that the only foundation 
that must be laid was that the military regularly received the records, 
integrated them into its own, and relied on them to be accurate.188   
The court agreed, reasoning that “documents may be admitted as 
business records despite not being prepared by the entity offering them, 
as long as it was the entity’s regular practice to obtain the documents 
from a third party, or the documents were integrated into the entity’s 
records and relied on in its day-to-day operations.”189  The court’s 
reasoning was based on two factors.190  The first factor was the entity’s 
 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. at 1341. 
185.  Id. 
186.  Id.  
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Evidence—Admissibility—Business Records, 14 FED. LITIGATOR 196, 197 (1999). 
190.  Air Land Forwarders, 172 F.3d at 1343 (“The trial court found both reliance and 
additional assurances of credibility to be present in this case.”); Evidence—Admissibility—
Business Record, supra note 189, at 197. 
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reliance on the incorporated document.191  The second factor was the 
circumstances that indicated reliability.192  
The approach to the business records exception hinted at in Central 
Prairie and spelled out in Air Land Forwarders provides an exception 
that would remedy the issues with Wisconsin’s current application of the 
rule.  First, it requires that the records be integrated into the entity’s 
own records.193  It is insufficient to possess the records.  Rather, the 
records must become a part of the records the entity uses to conduct its 
business.  In Air Land Forwarders, it seems this integration converts the 
records from those of the third party to those of the entity seeking to use 
them.194  Put in the language of the statute, it seems a new record is 
created from information (the third-party records) from a person with 
knowledge (the third party).  Accepting this interpretation of the 
process opens the door for a lesser foundational requirement.   
Second, the approach requires that the entity show it has a regular 
practice of obtaining, integrating, and relying on the records.195  This is a 
lesser foundational requirement because the entity must only have 
knowledge of its own practices and not that of the third party.  By 
lessening the foundational requirements in this manner, efficiency and 
fairness become more attainable. 
Further, this approach has safeguards to ensure justice is done.  The 
first safeguard is the requirement that the document be incorporated.  
This reaches back to the reason the exception was created—it is 
assumed that if the records are good enough for business, they are good 
enough for litigation.196  If an entity is unwilling to make the records a 
part of its own business records, it suggests the records are not good 
enough for business and thus not reliable for litigation. 
The second safeguard is that the court can look at the surrounding 
circumstances to determine the reliability of the records.  In Air Land 
 
191.  Air Land Forwarders, 172 F.3d at 1343 (“First, the repair estimates at issue were 
clearly relied upon by the military during the claims adjudication process.”); Evidence—
Admissibility—Business Record, supra note 189, at 197. 
192.  Air Land Forwarders, 172 F.3d at 1343 (“Second, the trial court explained that 
there were other assurances of reliability.  Military service members could be fined and/or 
imprisoned for submitting a false claim.”); Evidence—Admissibility—Business Record, supra 
note 189, at 197. 
193.  See Air Land Forwarders, 172 F.3d at 1343. 
194.  See id. 
195.  See id. at 1343–44. 
196.  See supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text. 
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Forwarders the court recognized that military service members could 
face steep punishments for falsifying claims.197  This made it more likely 
that the records of the claims would be legitimate.  In regulated 
industries, such as banking and finance, a similar situation exists that 
suggests the records are reliable.198 
The third safeguard is in the statute itself.  The statute states that 
even if all the requirements of the exception are met, the records can 
still be denied admission if “the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.199  A judge can review 
the circumstances surrounding the documents creation such as the 
timing and purpose for which it was created.  “The critical consideration 
is . . . the presence or absence of a motive to misrepresent or distort 
information.”200  Therefore, the courts still maintain the discretion, 
under this new approach, to deny the admission of third-party-provided 
records if the court finds the sources of the information indicate a lack 
of trustworthiness. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wisconsin’s foundational requirement for the business records 
exception is too rigid in the context of third-party records and creates 
inefficiencies that harm both the parties to the litigation and the courts.  
Therefore, the Wisconsin business records exception should be 
expanded in a manner similar to some federal jurisdictions.  The 
foundational requirement for the use of third-party records should first 
require that the records be integrated into the entitie’s own records.  
The entity should then demonstrate it has a regular business practice of 
obtaining, integrating, and relying on the records.  This approach will 
remedy Wisconsin’s inefficiencies by opening the door to summary 
judgment in many contexts while still providing appropriate safeguards 
to protect the parties. 
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